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Abstract—Recently, physical layer security in the optical layer
has gained significant traction. Security treats in optical networks
generally impact the reliability of optical transmission. Linear
Network Coding (LNC) can protect from both the security treats
in form of eavesdropping and faulty transmission due to jamming.
LNC can mix original data to become incomprehensible for an
attacker and also extend original data by coding redundancy, thus
protecting a data from errors injected via jamming attacks. In
this paper, we study the effectiveness of LNC to balance reliable
transmission and security in optical networks. To this end, we
combine the coding process with data flow parallelization of
the source and propose and compare optimal and randomized
path selection methods for parallel transmission. The study
shows that a combination of data parallelization, LNC and
randomization of path selection increases security and reliability
of the transmission. We analyze the so-called catastrophic security
treat of the network and show that in case of conventional
transmission scheme and in absence of LNC, an attacker could
eavesdrop or disrupt a whole secret data by accessing only one
edge in a network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical layer security in the optical layer has
gained significant traction. Security treats in optical networks
generally impact the reliability of optical transmission. In the
case of fiber cut and tapping attacks, an attacker has physical
access to network equipment and can disrupt the operation. The
interchannel eavesdropping and jamming, on the other hand,
can be lunched from a legitimately acquired optical channel
[1]. In addition, an attacker can exploit the crosstalk effects
and launch both jamming and eavesdropping attacks. For a
jamming attack, the attacker injects a high-power jamming
signal (5 − 10 dB above other, legitimate signals) into the
acquired lightpath inducing a severe interference effect for
transmission channel on the fiber link, thus degrading the
signal quality. At the same time, the attacker can collect the
leakage signals from adjacent lightpaths and extracts the secret
information by amplifying the collected signals [2].
A number of effective solutions against jamming and
eavesdropping attacks propose encryption and optimization
of lightpath disjointness; encryptions can effectively protect
against eavesdropping, and path disjointness can make eaves-
dropping more difficult. One of the prospective methods used
in networks other than optical includes linear network coding
(LNC). LNC can protect from both the jamming and eaves-
dropping. First, the source combines the original data with
random information and designs a network code in such a way
that only the receivers are able to decode the original packets.
The nodes can only decode packets if they have received a
sufficient number of linearly independent information vectors,
which an eavesdropper might not be able to do. Second, LNC
is also an erasure coding technique and thus can protect the
source message also from random errors, and errors injected
by the wiretapper via jamming attacks [3], [4]. LNC can
provide the so-called r-secure coding, whereby a wiretapper
can eavesdrop any r channels in the network, without gaining
any knowledge about the source message.
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of LNC to balance
the demands of reliable transmission and security in optical
networks. To this end, we combine the coding process with
parallelization of the source data stream, matching the gen-
eration size to the number of paths allocated in the optical
network. In our approach, a serial data stream from the source
is parallelized into n = k+ r lightpaths, whereby k represents
number of data blocks of the original (secret) data and r is
a number of redundancies (random data sources) generated
at the source to protect a secret data against wiretap security
attacks. In addition, we study how the path selection in the
optical layer impacts the security overall. Specifically, we
study two path selection methods in circuit switched (WDM)
transmission networks: 1) optimized paths, and 2) arbitrarily
available paths. The results show that LNC and a random path
selection method can effectively balance and improve both the
security and reliability of optical transmission.
II. MODELING AND ANALYSIS
A. Reference network model
Fig. 1 shows our reference network model. The data traffic
is modeled as a binary sequence, whereby original data can
be decomposed into M data blocks of the same length. Every
data block is then parallelized and distributed in a round
robin fashion to k sub-flows at the source nodes. This is
akin to the high speed Ethernet systems with Multiple Lane
Distribution (MLD) [5]. For instance, in an MLD Ethernet
network an incoming serial flow consists of multiple 66b data
blocks distributed over multiple lanes, where, for instance,
k = 4 lanes of 10Gbps each can be utilized to reach the total
transmission rate of 40Gbps [5].
Without loss of generality, and for simplicity, Fig. 1 illus-
trates how LNC is performed at the end-system, i.e., at source
and destination, and the assumption is that there is no coding
in the middle of the network1. The linear coding process is
performed over a field F2m , where 2m is the field size. Here,
each data block is decomposed into symbols, whereby each
symbol has the same length of m bits. Symbols encoded
1This is a valid assumption here, since additional coding inside the network
can only increase the security and reliability of the data transmitted [6], [7].
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Fig. 1: Reference network model with LNC in source and destination and security attacks in the network.
with the same set of coding coefficients are referred to as a
generation, while the number of original information symbols
k encoded with the same set of coding coefficients defines the
generation size. Here, new coding coefficients are utilized for
each new set of data blocks from k parallel sub-flows. Thus,
the source data of M data blocks result in Mk generations.
In this network system, we assume that the number of
outgoing encoded flows n, corresponding to the number of
required optical paths ξ over optical network, i.e., n = ξ.
Thus, the source sends the encoded data over ξ out of all
N available paths in the network. Generally, the number of
outgoing encoded flows n can be equal to or larger than
number of incoming flows k, n ≥ k, which is of special
importance here. We refer to r = n − k symbols sent as
redundancy. Thus, a reliable transmission of one generation
is possible since only k out of n = k + r arbitrary encoded
symbols/data blocks from the same generation of any of n
paths are required for a successful decoding at the receiver.
This provides protection against jamming attacks, when an
attacker disrupt only ν ≤ r data blocks from each generation.
At the same time, a eavesdropping can be successfully defeated
by LNC due to the fact that a wiretapper requires at least k
encoded data blocks from the same generation and knowledge
about coding coefficients to recover a secret data.
A final feature in our reference network is the path selec-
tion. We assume that a network provides N paths between
source and destination, while at most N optical paths are
available (i.e., not blocked) for a transmission request. For a
successful data transfer, the choice of n, n ≤ N paths in the
network can be either optimal (P-OPT) or arbitrary (P-RND).
An optimization goal maybe to find n shortest paths, with
a minimal differential delay, or similar. To this end, offline
and online tools maybe necessary to calculate paths, such as
IETF Path Computation Element (PCE). On the other hand,
any available path can be chosen for simplicity, or in absence
of optimization tools. We study both methods and evaluate the
benefits of path selection for security and reliability purposes,
since depending on the location of the attacked edge, different
path selection strategies will yield different performance.
B. Model Preliminaries
The network is represented as a directed and acyclic graph
G(V,E) = G, where V and E are vertex set and edge set,
respectively. The source and destination nodes are denoted as
s ∈ V and d ∈ V , respectively. A distinction is made between
incoming and outgoing edges of an arbitrary node v ∈ V ,
which are denoted as a set Ein(v) and Eout(v), respectively.
In our model, |Ein(v)| =
∑uin
i=1 uini · cini , if the optical
switch supports uin input interfaces and each input interface
i provides cini different available wavelengths. Similarly, we
define the outgoing links as |Eout(v)| =
∑uout
j=1 uoutj · coutj .
An incoming link of a node v is denoted as head(ei) = v,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ |Ein(v)|. An outgoing link ej ∈ E of a node
v is denoted as tail(ej) = v, where 1 ≤ j ≤ |Eout(v)|. Since
each edge and each link on a wavelength λx in the network
G connects two nodes, e.g. v′ and v′′, we denote each edge
as ev′v′′ and each link as ev′v′′(λx) ∈ ev′v′′ , respectively.
The refined definition of link is tail(ev′v′′,j(λx)) = v′ and
head(ev′v′′,i(λx)) = v
′′, 1 ≤ x ≤ cev′v′′ , where cev′v′′ is
capacity of edge measured in number of available wavelength
for transmission. In other words, each edge ev′v′′ provides
cev′v′′ parallel links between nodes v
′ and v′′.
In the proposed system, the time unit (tu) can be modeled
as a discrete time based on the link capacity of the physical
link and analyzed as transmission delay of one data block. Let
us assume that at time t, the incoming symbols at source node
s ∈ V are generated by the processes Xt(s, i) on every edge
i considered as an incoming link of a node s and denoted
as ei, head(ei) = s and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The incoming symbols
are encoded into symbols y(ej), 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and sent out on
each outgoing links ej ∈ E of a node s, tail(ej) = s. In this
model, the LNC encoder buffers incoming symbols from all
incoming flows in parallel, and encodes the same with simple
linear coding by using coding coefficients ai,ej from the finite
field F2m . Thus, the signal carried on an outgoing link ej of
source s at time t+ 1 is:
∀ej : tail(ej) = s : Y t+1(ej) =
k∑
i=1
ai,ej ·Xt(s, i) (1)
The decoder at receiver starts decoding as soon as one
generation is complete, i.e., k data blocks from the same
generation are received. The decoder is able to decode one
generation at a time by running Gaussian elimination. After
decoding, the data blocks are serialized and leave the decoding
functional block in the correct order. The decoded information
at time t + tδ on edge i in LNC decoder at the destination d
is modeled as [8]:
∀ei : tail(ei) = d : Zt+tδ(d, i) =
n∑
j=1
bi,ej · Y t(ej) (2)
, where tδ is decoding interval and bi,ej is decoding coefficients
from the finite field F2m .
C. Optical Path Selection
We assume that a network provides at most N optical
paths between source s and destination d, whereby these
paths are collected in path set Ψ. At the moment of trans-
mission request, only N out of N , N ≥ N , paths are
available. All N existing optical paths in G are arranged
in the vector
#»
P = (P0 P1 ... PN−2 PN−1 ) and vector
#»
d = (d0 d1 ... dN−2 dN−1 ) with related probabilities, that
any path Pl(s, d), l = 0, ...,N − 1, between source and
destination is available, and related end-to-end delays, whereby
#»
d is sorted in the ascending order. Here, Pl and dl describes
the same path Pl(s, d), l = 0, ...,N − 1. Generally, only
ξ = n, ξ ≤ N and ξ ≤ |Eout(s)| optical paths are required
for transmission, out of N ≤ N available paths. Given the
paths available, every intermediate node v can forward m
incoming data blocks from source over pre-configured set of
|Eout(v)| ≥ m available outgoing links. This is feasible, when
the min-cut between source s and destination d in G is at least
ξ = n, min cut{s, d} ≥ n, so that the set of all available
parallel paths ΨN ⊂ Ψ in G is larger than or equal to the
number of encoded flows, n, at the source s, i.e., N ≥ n.
As previously mentioned, paths can be chosen from the set
of all available paths in either arbitrary fashion, or, as it is more
commonly the case, according to an optimization objective, for
instance to minimize the differential delay. We refer to these
two methods as P-RND and P-OPT, respectively. To calculate
the probabilities that a certain path, and a set of paths, is chosen
for transmission, let us now assume that there is a collection,
or a super-set A, which contains a = C(|Φ|, γ) := (|Φ|γ )
path sets Aα, 1 ≤ α ≤ a, while Φ can be a collection of
all existing paths Ψ or a collection of available paths ΨN ,
i.e., Φ := Ψ, |Φ| = N or Φ := ΨN , |Φ| = N , and γ
can be a number of available paths N or the number of
required for transmission paths ξ, i.e., γ := N or γ := ξ.
Thus, each set Aα consists of γ elements. In contrast, set
Bα = Φ\Aα = {Pl(s, d)|(Pl(s, d) ∈ Bα) ∧ (Pl(s, d) /∈ Aα)}
from collection B is the αth set of remaining |Φ| − |Aα|
elements, which are not in the αth combination Aα. Thus,
the probability P ′′(α, γ,Φ), that γ out of |Φ| paths from set
Aα and not from set Bα are selected, is defined as
P ′′(α, γ,Φ) =
γ∏
i=1,
Pl,i∈Aα
Pl,i(α)
|Φ|−γ∏
t=1,
Pl,t∈Bα
(1− Pl,t(α)) (3)
, whereby the probabilities Pl,i(α) and Pl,t(α) are probabilities
of a path Pl(s, d), l = 1, 2, ...,N , which are collected in Aα
and Bα, respectively, to be available, while indexes i and t
show the sequence number of a path Pl(s, d) in the αth paths
combination from A and B, i.e., Aα and Bα, respectively.
As a result, the network provides N = j parallel available
paths with probability Pˆ (N = j,Φ) defined as follows
Pˆ (N = j,Φ) =
(|Φ|j )∑
α=1
P ′′(α, j,Φ) (4)
, where the αth set from the collection A contains all (|Φ|j )
path combinations of N = j available paths with related
probabilities described by vector
#»
P .
When there are N < ξ available paths, the transmission is
not possible and the transmission request will be blocked with
probability PB(ξ), i.e.,
PB(ξ,Φ) =
ξ−1∑
j=0
Pˆ (N = j,Φ) (5)
To find a set of optimal paths (P-OPT) with respect to
minimum differential delay, we arrange all N available paths
from each out of a =
(|Ψ|
N
)
combination Aα, 1 ≤ α ≤ a in
a delay vector
# »
dα = (d0 d1 ... dN−2 dN−1 ), sorted in the
ascending order of their corresponding path delays, i.e. dl′ ≤
dl′+1, of each available path Pl′(s, d), 0 ≤ l′ < N − 1. Thus,
the optimal paths are the paths with delays d0, d1, ..., dξ−1.
When paths are chosen randomly, i.e., P-RND, only one
out of a = C(N, ξ) :=
(
N
ξ
)
path combinations from AR is
selected for transmission; for example, paths from set ARα ∈AR, 1 ≤ α ≤ C(N, ξ). Since we assume that all C(N, ξ)
path combinations have the same probability to be selected for
transmission, the probability of an arbitrary paths combination
is defined as 1C(N,ξ) .
D. Security Analysis
1) Treat model: Let us assume that there are two col-
lections, or super-sets of edges, WE and WJ of sets WE
and WJ of wiretap edges in G, on which an attacker can
perform eavesdropping or jamming attacks. Moreover, we
assume that the wiretap edges are static, i.e., they were selected
by a wiretapper only once and not changed in course of
our analysis. The attacker can access only one w th set from
collection WE or WJ , i.e., WEw or W
J
w . However, we assume
that both types of attack can be performed simultaneously, but
on different edges, e.g., ev′v′′ ∈WEw and ev′v′′ /∈WJw . Thus,
an attacker can attack at most wˆ = wE + wJ , wE = |WEwE |
and wJ = |WJwJ |, edges in G at the same time. Moreover,
we consider the worst case scenario and assume that an
attacker is able to access all cev′v′′ wavelengths over one
fiber link, when it has an access to edge ev′v′′ between nodes
v′ and v′′. As a result, the total number of wiretap links is
cW =
∑
∀e
v′v′′∈W
cev′v′′ , where W = W
E
w
⋃
WJw .
2) Amount of data blocks attacked: When at most w edges
ev′v′′ ∈ E, with capacity cev′v′′ each, are wiretapped, i.e.,∀ev′v′′ ∈ WEw or ∀ev′v′′ ∈ WJw , the number of wiretap
paths yw is defined as a number of wiretap links utilized
for transmission in a certain path combination. On the other
hand, the probability that the wiretap paths are utilized for
transmission depends on path probability described by vector
#»
P , i.e., the probability that a wiretap paths are available.
Moreover, the expected number of utilized wiretap paths Y¯
is a function of an occurrence of a certain set of available
paths, which has a certain size N , and the final path selection
for data transmission, whereby some of them can be a wiretap
paths. We define the number of wiretap paths yw in a known,
αth, path combination utilized for transmission as
yw(α, ξ) =
ξ−1∑
l′=0,
P
l′ (s,d)∈Aα
Q(Pl′(s, d)) (6)
, where ξ is the number of paths in each path combination Aα
utilized for transmission. Since a wiretapper can gain only one
informative data block from each path regardless of the number
of wiretap links belonging to this path, each path Pl′(s, d) can
be considered only once as wiretap path in selected set Aα.
To constraint that, we define a function Q(Pl′(s, d)) as follow
Q(Pl′(s, d)) =
1, if
∑
∀ev′v′′∈W
ce
v′v′′∑
x=1
z(ev′v′′(λx),Pl′(s, d)) > 0
0, else
(7)
, where W is a set of wiretap edges in network, i.e. W = WEw
or W = WJw and consists of w edges , i.e., w := w
E ,
wE = |WEw | or w := wJ , wJ = |WJw |. The function
z(ev′v′′(λx),Pl′(s, d)) used in Eq. (6) is a logical function,
which shows whether a wiretap link ev′v′′(λx) is on the
transmission path Pl′(s, d), i.e.,
z(ev′v′′(λx),Pl′(s, d)) =
{
1, if ev′v′′(λx) ∈ Pl′(s, d)
0, else
(8)
In case of optimal path selection, i.e., P-OPT, the wiretap
path Pl′(s, d), 0 ≤ l′ < ξ− 1, is utilized, when it is available,
i.e., Pl′(s, d) ∈ ΨN , and sorted in delay vector #»d α as dl′ ∈
{d0, d1, ..., dξ−1}. Thus, ∀ev′v′′,i : ev′v′′,i ∈Ww , the number
of utilized wiretap paths is defined as follows
Y¯opt =
N∑
j=ξ
C(N ,j)∑
α=1
P ′′(α,j,Ψ)
1−PB(ξ,Ψ) · yw(α, ξ) (9)
, where C(N , j) = (Nj ) defines the number of all possible
combinations of N = j available paths, while the probability
of αth combination, which consists of N = j available paths,
P ′′(α, j,Ψ), can be determined by Eq. (3). Since transmission
is only successful, if there are enough available paths, i.e.,
ξ ≤ N , we only consider combinations of j ≥ ξ available
paths, which occur with probability (1−PB(ξ,Ψ)), see Eq. (5).
In case of random path selection, i.e., P-RND, ξ arbitrary
available paths can be utilized for transmission with equal
probability, whereby any ξ paths out of N existing paths can
be selected with equal probability, if these ξ paths are avail-
able at the moment of transmission request with probability
Pˆ (N = ξ,Ψ). Thus, the expected number of utilized wiretap
paths Y¯rnd is
Y¯rnd =
C(N ,ξ)∑
β=1
P ′′(β,ξ,Ψ)
Pˆ (N=ξ,Ψ)
yw(β, ξ) (10)
, where yw(β, ξ), P ′′(β, ξ,Ψ) and Pˆ (N = ξ,Ψ) are deter-
mined by Eqs. (6), (3) and (4), respectively.
To transmit all M data blocks from the same secret data,
the source utilizes ξ = n parallel reserved paths. Thus, Λ(y)
data blocks can be collected or disrupted by a wiretapper from
y wiretap paths, while at most M/ξ data blocks are transmitted
over each wiretap link ev′v′′,i, i.e. ev′v′′,i ∈WEw or ev′v′′,i ∈
WJw and ev′v′′,i(λx) ∈ Pl′(s, d). As a result, the total number
of wiretap data blocks Λ(y) is defined as follows
Λ(y) =
M · y
ξ
(11)
, where the variable y describes the number of wiretap paths
utilized for transmission and, depending on path selection
method and security attack, can be defined by Eqs. (6), (9) or
(10), i.e., y := yw(α, ξ) or y := Y¯opt or y := Y¯rnd. To protect
against jamming attacks, we propose to send over r additional
paths r = Λ(y) additional redundant data blocks generated at
the source. To evaluate the ability of an attacker to recover
or to disrupt a complete generation, we define the expected
number of attacked data blocks from the same generations as
Λ∗(y) = yk (12)
, where k is a number of data blocks required for successful
decoding at destination.
Path selection methods has impact on security. To analyze
this, let us consider the worst case scenario, where there is
only one wiretap edge in the network, but most of the paths
allocated to transmission go over it, thus leading to what
we refer to as catastrophic security treat. As a measure of
catastrophic security treat, we define two probabilities related
to eavesdropping and jamming attacks. For eavesdropping, we
evaluate the probability that a wiretapper is able to receive over
one wiretap edge ev′v′′ ∈ WEw at least ν = k LNC encoded
data blocks from each generation and to encode the whole
secret data. In case of jamming attacks, the wiretapper should
be able to disrupt at least ν = r + 1 data blocks from each
generation transmitted over edge ev′v′′ ∈ WJw and, thus, to
prevent successful decoding at the destination. In other words,
the secret data can experience a catastrophic security treat,
when ν utilized parallel path are established over the same
wiretap edge ev′v′′ . The probability of catastrophic security
treat Θopt(ν, ξ) in case of P-OPT over ξ parallel paths is
defined as
Θopt(ν, ξ) =
N∑
j=ξ
C(N ,j)∑
α=1
P ′′(α,j,Ψ)
1−PB(ξ,Ψ) · X (α, ν, ξ) (13)
, where function X(α, ν, ξ) described by Eq. (14) is a logical
function, which defines a valid for analysis path combinations,
i.e., the path sets utilized for transmission, where at least ν
paths are wiretap paths.
X (α, ν, ξ) =
{
1, if yw(α, ξ) ≥ ν
0, else
(14)
Finally, the probability of catastrophic security treat Θrnd(ν, ξ)
in case of P-RND transmission method over ξ random paths
is defined as
Θrnd(ν, ξ) =
C(N ,ξ)∑
β=1
P ′′(β,ξ,Ψ)
Pˆ (N=ξ,Ψ)
X (β, ν, ξ) (15)
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now show the theoretical results and validate the
same by simulations. The data blocks for both path selection
methods, i.e., P-RND and P-OPT, have the same size of 80 byte
and the secret data was composed of 20 data blocks. The LNC
process was implemented over finite field F28 with symbol size
8 bits. The transmission rate of each optical link was defined
Fig. 2: Directed nsfNet with allocated edge capacities.
as 10 Gbps. The traffic load was set to 1 data block per time
unit per lane at the source node and the network is lossless.
The normalized confidence intervals show 95% confidence and
small values, and are not shown for clarity.
For the simulations and analysis, we use the NSFnet
(Fig. 2). Here, there are in totalN = 18 parallel paths allocated
to the source node 0 and destination node 5. The numbers
on the edges in Fig. 2 are used to denote the amount of
parallel directed links allocated to the source-destination pair.
All paths are sorted in the ascending order according to the
path length, i.e., number of hops, and described by vector
#»
d = {2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Moreover,
the parallel paths have different probabilities to be available
at the moment of transmission request. We assume that these
probabilities decrease with increasing path length, i.e.,
#»
P =
{0.8, 0.79, 0.78, 0.77, 0.70, 0.69, 0.60, 0.59, 0.58, 0.57, 0.56,
0.55, 0.54, 0.53, 0.50, 0.45, 0.40, 0.35}. In case of P-RND, ξ =
n out of N ≤ N available parallel paths are selected randomly.
In case of P-OPT parallel transmission, the optical data flows
sent in parallel over ξ optimized (shortest) parallel paths.
We assumed that an attacker has access to three edges ei ∈
{2−5, 8−9, 12−13} (dashed edges in Fig 2) and can perform
different types of security attacks simultaneously on these
edges, at different time points, and in different combinations.
Based on this assumptions, we evaluate the amount of attacked
data blocks for eavesdropping and jamming attacks.
Fig. 3 shows the amount of eavesdropped data units per
generation, Λ(y)/M , on a sample wiretap edge. Here, the
transmission was implemented over ξ = k parallel paths, i.e.,
without redundancy, while the generation size was set to k = 4
and k = 8 data units. In case of P-OPT with 4 and 8 parallel
paths, the most data blocks, around 95% and 57%, respectively,
could be wiretap on the edge e2,5, which is a high capacity
edge (high number of parallel links) and belongs to the shortest
paths between source and destination. In contrast, the amount
of eavesdropped data blocks on other wiretap edges of longer
paths is much smaller and increases with a number of parallel
paths ξ = k utilized for transmission. In case P-RND, the
data blocks are distributed more uniformly over network and
wiretap edges and impact of k is not very significant, however
the amount of eavesdropped data blocks slightly increases with
increasing k on the edges that belong to longer paths. The
simulation results are very close to analytical results calculated
with Eqs. (9), (10) and (11).
Fig. 4 shows a more detailed security analysis with respect
to two specific wiretap edges, e2,5 and e8,9, which are chosen
as they could deliver the most data blocks to a wiretapper (see
Fig. 3). Here, the amount of eavesdropped data blocks from
the same generations Λ∗(y) is presented as a function of a
number of redundant data blocks, r, and generation size, k.
Fig. 3: Amount of wiretap data on a sample wiretap edge.
Fig. 4: Amount of wiretap data vs. coding redundancy.
Generally, the amount of eavesdropped data blocks increases
with increasing r, and, in case of P-OPT with k = 4, the
wiretapper is able to receive the complete generation on edge
e2,5 and to successfully decode it, if at least one redundant
data block is generated and sent over an additional path. In
contrast, edge e8,9 can provide at most 48.6% of data blocks
from the same generation with r = 3. On the other hand,
the P-RND disperses the secret data randomly so that the
amount of wiretapped data blocks is lesser on edges belonging
to the shorter paths, e.g., at most 84.8% on the edge e2,5 and
transmission over ξ = k+r = 4+3, and the amount of wiretap
data on edges belonging to longer paths is larger, e.g., 55% on
the edge e8,9 for the same ξ, compared to P-OPT. Also here,
the simulation results match the analysis (Eqs. (9), (10), (12)).
Next, we generate different combinations of wiretap edges,
ei ∈ {2− 5, 8− 9, 12− 13}, where only one, two, or all three
edges are attacked at the same time, i.e., w ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
collection W consists of 3, 3 and 1 elements, respectively.
The results in Fig. 5 present the mean number of eavesdropped
data blocks from the same generation and jamming success,
which were calculated over all possible combinations from
W. We show both the probability that a wiretapper is able
to recover a generation and, as a result, a whole secret data,
as well as the probability of jamming success. We assume the
jamming was successful, if the attacker disrupted more than
Fig. 5: Jamming success vs. wiretap data vs. wiretap edges.
r data blocks from the same generation and the receiver is
not able to decode. The amount of eavesdropped data units
in case of P-RND is much lower then in case of P-OPT
for any k, when the number of redundant data blocks and,
thus, number of paths is small, i.e., 0 ≤ r < 3. For a larger
redundancy (r = 3), P-OPT selects more shortest paths from
a pool of non-wiretap paths, e.g., path {0 − 1 − 3 − 4 − 5}
in Fig. 2, and showed better performance. At the same time,
P-RND distributed all data blocks nearly uniformly over all
edges and thus utilized all wiretap edges. Here, the number
of eavesdropped data blocks from the same generation Λ∗(y)
increases with increasing number of wiretap edges w attacked
at the same time. The attacker can recover each generation by
wiretapping of at least 2 edges in the network, when ξ = 4+3
paths are used. Overall, the amount of eavesdropped data units
from the same generation and, thus, the probability that an
attacker can recover the generation decreases with increasing
generation size k. The jamming attacks were not successful,
when the attacker had access to one edge only and r = 1 or
r = 3 (Fig. 5). In this case, 66.4% and 69.6% of generations
sent could not be decoded at destination, respectively, when
P-RND was utilized and k = 4.
Finally, we evaluate the probability of catastrophic security
treat, where we assume that the edge with a largest capacity
allocated to the source destination pair, which is utilized to
establish the shortest paths, is a wiretap edge, i.e., edge e2,5.
Fig. 6 shows the probability that an attacker can recover
or disrupt a whole secret data by accessing edge e2,5. The
secret data recovery was only possible, when the generation
size k was small, i.e., k = 4. For P-OPT, the probability
for catastrophic security treat was nearly constant 84% for
all levels of redundancy. For P-RND, the probability for
catastrophic security treat increased from 5% to 46% with
an increasing r. In contrast, the attacker gained no knowledge
about secret data regardless of path selection method, when
the generation size was set to k = 8. On the other hand, an
attacker could disrupt the complete secret data where no or
only one redundant data block was generated to protect each
generation. The increase in redundant data blocks decreases the
probability for catastrophic security treat. P-RND with k = 4
showed the best performance against jamming attacks, while
the probability for catastrophic security treat decreased from
Fig. 6: Probability to eavesdrop a complete generation on e2,5.
97% with no redundancy to 46% with r = 3.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the effectiveness of LNC to bal-
ance reliable transmission and security in optical networks. To
this end, we combined the coding process with parallelization
of the source data stream. We proposed and compared two
WDM path selection methods: 1) optimized (shortest) paths,
and 2) randomly selected paths. We analyzed and compared
both the security capabilities against eavesdropping attacks,
and reliability against jamming attacks. The results showed that
LNC and parallel transmission over randomly selected paths
significantly increases security against both eavesdropping and
jamming compared with conventional WDM transmission,
especially in the case, when a wiretapper has access to the
shortest paths between source and destination. The combi-
nation of LNC and random path selection requires smaller
number of redundancies to prevent jamming attacks. Finally,
we showed that in absence of physical layer security measures,
conventional WDM transmission can lead to a catastrophic
security treat, whereby an attacker can eavesdrop or to disrupt
a whole secret data by accessing only one edge in a network.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Yuan and D. Stewart, “Protection of optical networks against inter-
channel eavesdropping and jamming attacks,” in Computational Science
and Computational Intelligence, International Conference on, vol. 1,
2014, pp. 34–38.
[2] M. Furdek, N. Skorin-Kapov, S. Zsigmond, and L. Wosinska, “Vulnera-
bilities and security issues in optical networks,” in Transparent Optical
Networks, 16th International Conference on, 2014, pp. 1–4.
[3] N. Cai and T. Chan, “Theory of secure network coding,” Proceedings of
the IEEE, vol. 99, no. 3, pp. 421–437, March 2011.
[4] C. Fragouli, J.-Y. Le Boudec, and J. Widmer, “Network coding: An
instant primer,” SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 36, no. 1, pp.
63–68, Jan. 2006.
[5] “Iso/iec/ieee international standard for ethernet,” ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-
3:2014(E), pp. 1–3754, April 2014.
[6] S. Pfennig and E. Franz, “Secure network coding: Dependency of
efficiency on network topology,” in Communications (ICC), 2013 IEEE
International Conference on, June 2013, pp. 2100–2105.
[7] J. Wang, J. Wang, K. Lu, B. Xiao, and N. Gu, “Modeling and optimal
design of linear network coding for secure unicast with multiple streams,”
Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 24, no. 10,
pp. 2025–2035, Oct 2013.
[8] R. Koetter and M. Medard, “An Algebraic Approach to Network Cod-
ing,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2003.
